The code runs as a standard Linux process. Seccomp acts as a strict allowlist filter, reducing the set of permitted system calls. However, any allowed syscall still executes directly against the shared host kernel. Once a syscall is permitted, the kernel code processing that request is the exact same code used by the host and every other container. The failure mode here is that a vulnerability in an allowed syscall lets the code compromise the host kernel, bypassing the namespace boundaries.
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Per-job PID + mount + IPC namespaces via clone3 — so each execution is isolated from other executions inside the same gVisor sandbox
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